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FREE TO RETALIATE: A PLAINTIFF MUST 
SHOW RETALIATION IS THE ONLY 
MOTIVATION FOR AN EMPLOYER’S 
RETALIATORY ACTION 
Sansan Lin 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,1 an 
employment discrimination case, was overshadowed in the media by 
other high-profile cases decided in the same three-day period.2 But 
the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in Nassar will significantly 
weaken workers’ rights and protections against discrimination in the 
workplace.3 An employee will have much more difficulty in 
obtaining redress for workplace discrimination and retaliation 
because the employee must now prove that only the desire to retaliate 
motivated the employer’s action.4 Even if the employer intended to 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.P.H. Health Policy, The 
George Washington University, May 2010; B.S. Molecular Cell Developmental Biology, 
University of California Los Angeles, May 2005. I would like to thank Professor Aimee Dudovitz 
for teaching me how to write during my first year of law school, for her continued support and 
guidance through school, and for her feedback on this Comment. Thank you to the editors and 
staffers of Volume 47 of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their work on this Supreme 
Court issue. And lastly, I would be remiss not to give a special thanks to the Editor-in-Chief of 
Volume 48, Cameron Bell, for her thoughtful and careful feedback and efforts in pushing this 
issue to publication, and the Executive Editor of Volume 48, Lauren Gerenraich. 
 1. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 2. The Supreme Court decided the other University of Texas case—an affirmative action 
case—on the same day (June 24, 2013) in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013). In the next two days, the Supreme Court handed down decisions in the Voting Rights Act 
and same-sex marriage cases in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) and United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). A search of media coverage on the Nassar case results 
in a few articles in smaller, local publications as opposed to publications in The Wall Street 
Journal, The New York Times, and other more well-known print and online media for the 
aforementioned three cases. 
 3. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013). 
 4. See id. at 2525–26, 2534. 
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retaliate, the employer can avoid liability entirely by providing any 
other justification for taking a challenged employment action.5 
Prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of an 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and 
prohibition of employer retaliation against an individual who has 
opposed or filed a claim of employment discrimination share a 
“symbiotic relationship.”6 But, the Supreme Court in Nassar has 
“drive[n] a wedge” between status-based discrimination and 
employer retaliation claims by ruling that they are distinct claims and 
that to prevail on a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must meet 
the high but-for causation standard.7 Nassar establishes two separate 
causation standards for two claims that have been regarded as “twin 
safeguards in . . . ‘mixed-motive’ [employment discrimination] 
cases.”8 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nassar 
is at odds with Congress’s intent behind its 1991 amendments to 
Title VII, and the Supreme Court’s prior understanding of the 
relationship between Title VII’s discrimination and retaliation 
prohibitions. Part II lists the provisions at issue in Nassar and 
provides an overview of the interchange between the Supreme Court 
and Congress in interpreting the appropriate causation standard for 
Title VII claims. Part III sets forth the facts and procedural posture of 
the case. Part IV discusses the Court’s holding and its reasoning. Part 
V argues that the Court’s reasoning in Nassar is flawed because it 
contradicts Congress’s intent and diverges from Supreme Court 
precedent. Part VI concludes with the practical implications of the 
Nassar holding and challenges Congress to again restore Title VII’s 
protections against discrimination in the workplace. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “1964 Act”) 
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.9 Title VII also 
 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 7. Id. at 2535. 
 8. Id. 
 9. In 1964, Congress passed employment protections in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)). 
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prohibits retaliation by an employer against an employee who has 
opposed or filed a charge of employment discrimination.10 
Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits “status-based discrimination”—
discrimination against an individual based on five listed 
characteristics.11 It provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.12 
Section 2000e-3(a) prohibits employer retaliation providing: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.13 
A quarter century after the passage of the 1964 Act, the Supreme 
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins14 explained the causation 
standard necessary to establish a status-based discrimination claim 
under § 2000e-2(a).15 Though there was no majority opinion, six 
justices agreed on the viability of a mixed-motive theory16 “that a 
plaintiff could prevail on a claim of status-based discrimination if he 
or she could show that one of the prohibited traits was a ‘motivating’ 
or ‘substantial’ factor in the employer’s decision.”17 Under the Price 
Waterhouse framework, if a plaintiff successfully established that 
 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 11. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522. The Court separates wrongful employer conduct under 
§ 2000e into two categories. The first is status-based discrimination, and the second is employer 
retaliation. Id. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). 
 14. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 15. Id. at 258 (defining “because of” in § 2000e-2(a)(1)). 
 16. See id. at 240–42. 
 17. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (citing Price Waterhouse, 
490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin motivated the employer, 
then the burden shifted to the employer to prove that it would have 
taken the same actions, even without a discrimination-based 
motivation. If the employer could successfully demonstrate this, the 
employer would avoid liability.18  
Two years after Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 (the “1991 Act”).19 The 1991 Act added a new 
provision to Title VII codifying the mixed-motive theory, otherwise 
known as the motivating-factor causation standard of the Price 
Waterhouse framework.20 The new provision, § 2000e-2(m), states: 
“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”21 Thus, 
Congress agreed with the Price Waterhouse holding that a plaintiff 
alleging a § 2000e-2(a) violation need not meet the but-for standard, 
which would require the employee to show that status-based 
discrimination was the only reason for the employer’s challenged 
practice. Rather, a plaintiff need only meet the less stringent 
motivating-factor causation standard, by showing that status-based 
discrimination motivated the employer’s practice. 
However, Congress did not agree with the Price Waterhouse 
burden-shifting framework, because the 1991 Act abrogated it with 
§ 2000e-5(g)(2).22 Under § 2000e-5(g)(2), if an employer can prove 
that it would have taken the same employment action regardless of 
the five traits, it can avoid monetary damages and a reinstatement 
order,23 but not complete liability like it could under Price 
Waterhouse. 
This was the state of the law when the Supreme Court jumped 
back into the fray with the Nassar decision. 
 
 18. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526. 
 19. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2); Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 
557 U.S. 167, 178 n.5 (2009)). 
 23. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 178 n.5). 
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III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Facts 
The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (the 
“University”) trains medical, graduate, and health profession 
students, residents, and postdoctoral fellows.24 The University has 
affiliation agreements with healthcare facilities, including Parkland 
Memorial Hospital (the “Hospital”), to give its students the 
opportunity to obtain clinical experience.25 The Hospital’s affiliation 
agreement with the University requires it to offer physician positions 
to the University’s faculty members.26 
Dr. Naiel Nassar “is a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent 
who specializes in internal medicine and infectious diseases.”27 From 
1995 to 1998 and from 2001 to 2006, he was a member of both the 
University’s faculty and the Hospital’s staff of physicians.28 Dr. 
Phillip Keiser was Nassar’s principal supervisor until 2004, when the 
Hospital hired Dr. Beth Levine as the University’s Chair of 
Infectious Disease Medicine.29 Keiser continued to directly supervise 
Nassar, but Levine became his ultimate superior.30 
Nassar believed Levine was biased against him because of his 
Middle Eastern heritage.31 Levine singled out Nassar; she questioned 
his productivity and work ethic and scrutinized his billing practices 
despite Keiser’s assurances that Nassar worked very hard.32 In 2005, 
Levine opposed hiring another Middle Eastern physician and 
commented in Keiser’s presence that “Middle Easterners are lazy.”33 
After the Hospital hired the other doctor, “Levine [commented], 
again in Keiser’s presence, that the Hospital had ‘hired another 
one.’”34 
 
 24. About UT Southwestern Facts and Figures, UT SW. MED. CTR., http:// 
www.utsouthwestern.edu/about-us/facts.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
 25. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 2523–24. In 1998, Nassar left both positions to pursue additional medical 
education, but returned to his positions in 2001. Id. at 2523. 
 29. Id. at 2523; id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 2523 (majority opinion). 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 2523 (majority opinion). 
 33. Id. at 2536 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. 
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Nassar met with Dr. Gregory Fitz, the University’s Chair of 
Internal Medicine, numerous times regarding Levine’s behavior and 
perceived harassment.35 Levine’s hostility and bias against him led 
Nassar to arrange with the Hospital to continue working at its clinic 
without also continuing as faculty at the University, in an effort to 
remove himself from Levine’s supervision.36 After negotiations, the 
Hospital verbally offered Nassar a staff position.37 
Shortly after reaching this agreement, Nassar wrote a letter to 
Fitz and sent copies to others, resigning from his teaching position at 
the University.38 In this letter, Nassar stated that the main reason for 
his resignation was Levine’s continued harassment stemming from 
bias against Arabs and Muslims.39 Fitz, shocked by the letter, told 
Keiser that Levine had been publicly humiliated and needed to be 
publicly exonerated.40 Fitz opposed the Hospital’s staff position offer 
to Nassar, arguing that this arrangement contradicted the Hospital 
and University’s affiliation agreement requiring that staff members 
also be University faculty.41 The Hospital withdrew its offer to 
employ Nassar.42 
B.  Procedural Posture 
Nassar first filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found “credible 
testimonial evidence that the University had retaliated against Nassar 
for his allegations of discrimination by Levine.”43 Nassar then filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas, alleging two Title VII violations. Nassar alleged that the 
University’s discrimination against him on the basis of his race, 
religion, and national origin resulted in his constructive discharge—a 
status-based discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a).44 Second, 
 
 35. Id. at 2523 (majority opinion). 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 2536 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 2523–24 (majority opinion). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 2536 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 44. Id. at 2524 (majority opinion). 
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Nassar alleged that the University retaliated against him for 
complaining about Levine’s conduct by preventing the Hospital from 
hiring him—a retaliation claim under § 2000e-3(a).45 
At trial, the district court instructed the jury on the retaliation 
claim that Nassar needed only to prove that the University acted at 
least in part to retaliate.46 The jury found for Nassar on both Title VII 
claims and awarded him $438,167.66 in backpay and over $3 million 
in compensatory damages.47 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in 
part and vacated in part.48 The Fifth Circuit vacated the jury’s verdict 
on constructive discharge, concluding that Nassar had not provided 
sufficient evidence to support his claim that Levine’s discrimination 
resulted in his discharge.49 However, it affirmed the jury’s finding on 
the retaliation claim “on the theory that retaliation claims . . . like 
claims of status-based discrimination . . . require only a showing that 
retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse employment 
action, rather than its but-for cause.”50 The Fifth Circuit found that 
the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Fitz’s opposition to 
Nassar’s employment was motivated in part by the desire to retaliate 
against Nassar for his complaints regarding Levine.51 
The Fifth Circuit denied the University’s petition for a rehearing 
and rehearing en banc.52 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.53 The 
issue before the Court was whether the mixed-motive causation 
standard applicable to § 2000e-2(a) claims was also applicable to 
§ 2000e-3(a) retaliation claims.54 
IV.  THE COURT’S ANALYSIS 
Considering the question of which causation standard is 
appropriate for a § 2000-e3(a) retaliation claim, Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, concluded that “[t]he text, structure, and 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2536 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 49. Id. at 450.  
 50. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524 (majority opinion). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 688 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 53. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517. 
 54. Id. at 2522–23. 
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history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation 
claim under § 2000-e3(a) must establish that his or her protected 
activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the 
employer.”55 The Court’s opinion emphasized what it saw as a clear 
distinction between a discrimination claim and a retaliation claim 
under Title VII, labeling the first “status-based discrimination” and 
the second “employer retaliation.”56 
The Court began its analysis with a discussion of its holding in 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,57 which interpreted “because 
of” in a provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA) as requiring a showing of but-for causation.58 The 
Court used the reasoning of Gross to conclude that § 2000e-3(a) 
requires proof “that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the 
challenged employment action.”59 The Court rejected the 
interpretation that § 2000e-3(a) requires only the motivating-factor 
causation standard, noting three major flaws in that interpretation60 
The Court also noted the implications of lessening the causation 
standard for retaliation claims.61 
A.  Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. Is Persuasive 
In reaching its conclusion that § 2000e-3(a) requires a plaintiff 
to meet the but-for causation standard, the Court began by discussing 
its conclusion and reasoning in Gross with respect to the issue of 
causation in the context of the ADEA.62 The Court found that 
although Gross discussed a different statute and limited its judgment 
to the ADEA, Gross is not without “persuasive force” and 
“possess[es] significant parallels.”63 
 
 55. Id. at 2534. 
 56. Id. at 2522. Justice Kennedy began, “This opinion discusses the causation rules for two 
categories of wrongful employer conduct prohibited by Title VII. The first type is called, for 
purposes of this opinion, status-based discrimination. . . . The second type of conduct is employer 
retaliation . . . .” Id. 
 57. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 58. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527. 
 59. Id. at 2528. 
 60. See infra Part III.A. 
 61. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531–32  
 62. Id. at 2527. 
 63. Id. at 2527–28. 
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The Court in Gross considered whether the ADEA’s text 
“authorizes a mixed-motives age discrimination claim.”64 
Section 623(a) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s age.”65 
The Court concluded that § 623(a) did not authorize mixed-
motive claims.66 It reached this conclusion by looking at the ordinary 
meaning of the text, noting that “[s]tatutory construction must begin 
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the 
ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the 
legislative purpose.”67 To determine the ordinary meaning of 
“because of,” the Court looked to English dictionaries defining 
“because of” to mean “by reason of” or “on account of.”68 Given this 
understanding of the phrase, the ADEA provision in question meant 
that a plaintiff needed to prove that age was the “but-for” cause of 
the employer’s adverse decision.69 
In Gross, the Court declined to adopt the Price Waterhouse 
interpretation of causation, concluding that textual differences 
between Title VII and the ADEA prevented the application of Price 
Waterhouse to the ADEA.70 The Court in Gross noted that though 
Congress made a number of changes to the ADEA in the 1991 Act, it 
did not add a clarification provision like it did to Title VII’s new 
provision § 2000e-2(m).71 Additionally, the Gross Court held that “it 
would not be proper to read Price Waterhouse as announcing a rule 
that applied to both statutes, despite their similar wording and 
contemporaneous enactment” because Congress’s 1991 amendments 
to Title VII—the new provision setting forth the motivating factor 
standard72 and the abrogation of the Price Waterhouse  
 
 64. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175. 
 65. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 66. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175. 
 67. Id. (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 
(2004)). 
 68. Id. at 176. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 178 n.5. 
 71. Id. at 174–75. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
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burden-shifting framework—suggested that the motivating-factor 
standard did not flow “organically” from the text.73 In other words, 
Congress would not have made these amendments if the text of Title 
VII could be read as setting such a standard. Since the meaning did 
not flow organically from the text, the Gross Court concluded that 
the standard could not be read into the ADEA because the ADEA did 
not contain a provision similar to § 2000e-2(m). 
The Court in Nassar concluded that because “Title VII’s  
anti-retaliation provision, which is set forth in § 2000e-3(a), appears 
in a section separate from Title ban on status-based discrimination,” 
and because the anti-relation provision is textually similar to the 
ADEA provision considered in Gross, the “proper conclusion . . . is 
that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to 
retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment 
action.”74 
B.  The Court’s Assessment of Flaws in Nassar 
and the United States’ Argument 
Nassar and the United States’ main argument was that 
(1) retaliation is defined by the statute to be an unlawful 
employment practice; (2) § 2000e-2(m) allows unlawful 
employment practices to be proved based on a showing that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for—but not necessarily the but-for factor 
in—the challenged employment action; and (3) the Court 
has . . . held that retaliation for complaining about race 
discrimination is discrimination based on race.75 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and noted three 
major problems with the interpretation that the motivating-factor 
standard applies to retaliation claims: (1) such a reading is 
inconsistent with the provision’s plain language;76 (2) such a reading 
is inconsistent with the design and structure of Title VII;77 and (3) 
the Court’s preceding decisions interpreting federal 
 
 73. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527 (2013) (citing Gross, 557 
U.S. at 178 n.5). 
 74. Id. at 2528. 
 75. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 2529. 
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antidiscrimination laws as treating “status-based discrimination as 
also prohibiting retaliation”78 do not apply to statutes as “precise, 
complex, and exhaustive as Title VII.”79 
1.  Plain Language of § 2000e-2(m) and Section 107 of the 1991 Act 
The Court concluded that interpreting § 2000e-3(a) as requiring 
the motivating-factor standard is inconsistent with the plain language 
§ 2000e-2(m).80 According to the Court, the plain language of 
§ 2000e-2(m) and section 107 of the 1991 Act, which created it, 
indicate Congress’s intention that the motivating-factor causation 
standard not extend to all unlawful employment practices defined by 
Title VII.81 
The Court stated that § 2000e-2(m) only addresses status-based 
discrimination because the provision begins by referring to “unlawful 
employment practices,” but then only specifies actions based on the 
employee’s status—race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.82 
Because the provision only refers to the unlawful employment 
practice of discriminating on the basis of the five characteristics but 
not to retaliation claims, the Court concluded that “given this clear 
language,” Congress intended to limit the provision’s coverage to 
only discrimination under § 2000e-2(a) and not retaliation claims 
under § 2000e-3(a).83 “[I]t would be improper to conclude that what 
Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its scope.”84 
The Court also noted, the fact that a different portion of the 1991 
Act “contains an express reference to all unlawful employment 
actions, reinforces the conclusion that Congress acted deliberately 
when it omitted retaliation claims from § 2000e-2(m).”85 For 
example, section 109 of the 1991 Act exempts employers in foreign 
countries from complying with §§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 if doing so 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 2530. 
 80. Id. at 2528. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. “An unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m) (2006). 
 83. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 2529.  
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would cause the employer to violate the laws of the country where 
the workplace is located.86 Section 109 references both 
discrimination and retaliation sections by explicitly listing “section 
703 or 704,” which correspond to the sections prohibiting status-
based discrimination and retaliatory employer actions in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.87 
The Court noted that section 109 indicates that Congress 
understood what language was necessary to reference all unlawful 
employment practices under Title VII, so if Congress had intended to 
“make the motivating-factor standard applicable to all Title VII 
claims,” then it would have used the same language in section 107 of 
the 1991 Act.88 However, section 107 only provides that it will 
amend section 703 (codified in § 2000e-2) of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, but makes no reference to section 704 (codified in § 2000e-
3).89 
2.  Structure and Design of Title VII 
The Court found that applying the motivating-factor standard to 
Title VII retaliation claims would also be inconsistent “with the 
design and structure of the statute as a whole.”90 First, the Court 
found the placement of § 2000e-2(m) significant and indicative of 
Congress’s intentions.91 Second, the Court found the complexity of 
Title VII distinguished it from other broad discrimination statutes, 
and thus the Court’s holding in Nassar did not contradict prior 
Supreme Court interpretations of retaliation claims.92 
a.  Placement of § 2000e-2(m) 
The Court found it significant that Congress inserted the 
motivating-factor provision in § 2000e-2, the same subsection that 
prohibits status-based discrimination.93 To the Court, this particular 
placement of the new provision, codifying the motivating-factor 
 
 86. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 12111 (2006). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529. 
 89. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-5(g) (2006). 
 90. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 2529–30. 
 93. Id. 
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causation standard as applied to status-based discrimination claims, 
indicates Congress’s intention to only apply this standard to  
§ 2000e-2 discrimination claims. 
b.  Default interpretations of antidiscrimination laws 
do not apply to Title VII 
The Court did not reject Nassar and the United States’ argument 
that previous Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
antidiscrimination laws have generally treated prohibitions of status-
based discrimination as also prohibiting retaliation.94 But the Court 
rejected the argument that these prior cases support the interpretation 
that the motivating-factor standard applies to retaliation claims. It 
concluded that because Title VII “is a detailed statutory scheme,” 
those cases did not control the issue in Nassar.95 
The Court acknowledged that its cases have interpreted 
Congress’s enactment of broadly phrased antidiscrimination statutes 
as demonstrating Congress’s intent to prohibit retaliation against 
those who oppose or report the type of discrimination at issue.96 
However, the Court concluded these cases did not control its 
decision because Title VII is a very “precise, complex, and 
exhaustive” statute.97 Applying “the default rules that apply only 
when Congress writes a broad and undifferentiated statute” would 
improperly adopt an incorrect interpretation.98 
Additionally, to further support its argument that it would be 
improper to apply the Court’s default interpretation of 
antidiscrimination statutes, the Court noted Congress’s enactment of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which included 
an express anti-retaliation provision.99 Congress enacted the ADA a 
year before crafting 1991 Act amendments to Title VII.100 Therefore, 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 2530. 
 96. Id. at 2530. E.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 452, 452–53 (2008) 
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which states that all persons shall have equal rights under the law, 
not only prohibits racial discrimination but also retaliation against those who oppose it); Gómez-
Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (finding a bar on retaliation in the federal-employee 
provisions of the ADEA). 
 97. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2530. 
 98. Id. at 2530–31. 
 99. Id. at 2531. 
 100. Id. 
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because Congress knew how to craft express anti-retaliation 
provisions, not including such language in the 1991 Act’s Title VII 
amendments indicated Congress’s intent to exclude relation claims 
from the motivating-factor causation standard.101 
C.  Repercussions of Lessening the Causation Standard 
The Court warned of a number of practical consequences that 
would result from applying the motivating-factor standard to 
§ 2000e-3(a) retaliation claims. 
First, the Court noted that the number of retaliation claims filed 
with the EEOC doubled from around 16,000 to over 31,000 over a 
fifteen-year period.102 Concerned with the number of retaliation 
claims, the Court stressed that “proper interpretation . . . of § 2000e-
3(a) and its causation standard have central importance to the fair 
and responsible allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation 
systems.”103 
Additionally, the Court cautioned that applying the motivating-
factor causation standard could contribute to the filing of frivolous 
claims.104 For example, an employee who knows his or her employer 
is about to cause a change in employment status (for instance, firing 
for poor work performance, transferring assignments or locations) 
could make an unfounded claim of discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.105 Once the employment 
change occurs, the employee could file a retaliation claim.106 In the 
eyes of the Court, applying the motivating-factor causation standard 
would make it more difficult to dismiss frivolous claims.107 
V.  DISCUSSION 
The Court’s discussion of the number of discrimination and, in 
particular, retaliation claims filed with the EEOC, and its concern 
with frivolous claims, may reveal the Court’s true motivation behind 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (citing Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited 
June 20, 2013)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 2531–32. 
 105. Id. at 2532. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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its employer-friendly Nassar holding. Though the Court used textual 
and structural arguments to support its interpretation of congressional 
intent, its holding contradicts Congress’s stated purposes of Title VII 
and subsequent amendments enacted via the 1991 Act. The Court’s 
holding also diverges from a line of preceding Supreme Court cases. 
Lastly, the Court’s reasoning about the text and structure of Title VII 
is flawed because these same textual and structural arguments could 
also be interpreted to support a different conclusion—namely, that 
the mixed-motive standard does apply to retaliation claims. 
A.  The Nassar Holding Contradicts Congressional Intent 
The Court looked to the 1991 Act’s text and, in the Court’s 
words, “the structure” of Title VII to conclude that Congress 
intended to distinguish retaliation claims from status-based 
discrimination claims and to require a higher standard for these 
claims. 
Congress passed the 1991 Act in part to respond to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.108 Specifically, the purpose of 
the 1991 Act was to “restor[e] the civil rights protections that were 
dramatically limited by recent Supreme Court decisions”109 and to 
“strengthen existing protections and remedies available under federal 
civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate 
compensation for victims of discrimination.”110 
The 1991 Act restored and strengthened Title VII protections 
and remedies by eliminating the Price Waterhouse burden shifting, 
which allowed an employer to avoid liability entirely, and by 
creating § 2000(m), which codified the motivating-factor causation 
standard.111 Congress did not disagree with the Court’s adoption of a 
causation standard that was less stringent than the but-for standard, 
but Congress thought allowing an employer the ability to escape 
 
 108. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 45 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583 
[hereinafter House Report Part I]. 
 109. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(II), at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694 [hereinafter 
House Report Part II]. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) (2006). 
 112. See id. 
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liability under the Price Waterhouse framework limited Title VII 
protections.112 
The Court’s holding in Nassar contradicts Congress’s stated 
goals in passing the 1991 Act because it once again weakens Title 
VII protections, particularly against employer retaliation. The 
Court’s interpretation is that, despite Congress’s stated intentions to 
strengthen and restore, Congress really intended to require plaintiffs 
to meet a stringent but-for causation standard allowing an employer 
the ability to avoid liability on retaliation claims. Under the Court’s 
interpretation, an employer can retaliate against an employee for 
making a discrimination claim and face no liability if it can provide 
any other additional reason for taking the retaliatory action.113 
But, Congress found Price Waterhouse “inadequately 
protective” because its burden-shifting framework allowed an 
employer to avoid liability.114 Thus, given the legislative history of 
the 1991 Act, the Court’s interpretation makes little sense. 
B.  Supreme Court Precedent 
The Court’s distinction between status-based discrimination and 
retaliation claims diverges from a line of Supreme Court cases that 
have recognized the “close connection between discrimination and 
retaliation for complaining about discrimination.”115 Although the 
Court in Nassar did not disagree with precedent regarding 
discrimination and retaliation, it concluded that those prior decisions 
were not controlling because Title VII is unlike the statutes 
considered in those preceding cases.116 But, in reality Title VII is not 
so different from those other antidiscrimination statutes. 
In a line of decisions prior to Nassar, the Supreme Court held 
that a ban on discrimination encompasses retaliation because the 
enforcement of antidiscrimination depends on those who are willing 
to speak against, bear witness to, or file complaints of 
 
 112. See id. 
 113. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2544 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court’s but-for causation standard does not mean that the plaintiff has failed to 
prove she was subjected to unlawful retaliation. It does mean, however, that proof of a retaliatory 
motive alone yields no victory for the plaintiff.”). 
 114. See id. at 2538. 
 115. See id. at 2537. 
 116. Id. at 2530 (majority opinion). 
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discrimination.117 The Court has long understood prohibitions against 
discrimination as also prohibiting retaliation for complaining of or 
speaking against discrimination.118 In fact, the Court has held that 
“retaliation in response to a complaint about [proscribed] 
discrimination is ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of [the characteristic 
Congress sought to immunize against adverse employment 
action] . . . .’”119 
In Nassar, the Court attempted to distinguish Title VII from 
other antidiscrimination statutes by noting that it is a “detailed 
statutory scheme” because it “enumerates specific unlawful 
employment practices,”120 “defines key terms,”121 “exempts certain 
types of employers,”122 and “creates an administrative agency.”123 
However, the ADEA also contains provisions that proscribe 
retaliation, as well as provisions that set out specific prohibited 
employer practices.124 Indeed, some provisions of the ADEA are 
broad while others are specific and detailed, and yet the Court still 
interpreted the federal-sector provision of the ADEA prohibiting 
discrimination based on age125 to also bar retaliation.126 Like the 
 
 117. Id. at 2337 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. v. White, 548 
U.S. 53, 63 (2006)). 
 118. The Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that all citizens of the United 
States have the same property rights, protected “a white man who suffered retaliation after 
complaining of discrimination against his black tenant.” Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 
U.S. 229 (1969). In the context of sex discrimination, the Court has held that “[r]etaliation against 
a person because [he] has complained of sex discrimination . . . is another form of intentional sex 
discrimination.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v. 
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005)) (internal citations omitted). The Court held 
that “the federal-sector provision of the [ADEA . . .] barring discrimination ‘based on age,’ also 
proscribes retaliation.” Id. at 2538 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 
U.S. 474, 479–91 (2008). The Court has also held that retaliation for race discrimination 
constitutes discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides that all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States should have equal rights. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 
U.S. 442, 447–57 (2008). 
 119. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179 n.3 (emphasis added). 
 120. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2530. The Court cited § 2000e-2(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (d) (which 
prohibits “status-based discrimination by employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, 
and training programs respectively”), § 2000e-3(a) (which prohibits “retaliation for opposing, or 
making or supporting a complaint about, unlawful employment actions”), and § 2000e-3(b) 
(which prohibits “advertising a preference for applicants of a particular race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin”). Id. 
 121. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)). 
 122. Id. (citing § 2000e-1). 
 123. Id. (citing §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-12). 
 124. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), (d) (2006). 
 125. 28 U.S.C. § 633(a) (2006). 
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ADEA, Title VII is detailed in some provisions, but it also contains 
broad and general provisions.127 
Not only is Title VII not distinguishable from other 
antidiscrimination statutes simply because it contains some 
specifications, but the Court’s reasoning leads to the conclusion that 
“when Congress homed in on retaliation and codified the 
proscription, as it did in Title VII, Congress meant to have less force 
than the protection available when the statute does not mention 
retaliation.”128 This conclusion suggests that when Congress takes 
more time to write a specific statute, it means that Congress intended 
these statutes to offer less protection then broadly written statutes.129 
Additionally, this conclusion makes even less sense given that 
Congress intended to strengthen Title VII protections. 
C.  Flaws in the Court’s Textual and Structural Arguments 
The Court supported its reasoning and holding with textual and 
structural arguments, but these arguments are flawed in a number of 
ways. In fact, the very same text and structural aspects of Title VII 
that the Court cites to support its argument also support the 
conclusion that the mixed-motive standard, not the but-for standard, 
applies to retaliation claims. 
1.  The Court Used Gross’s Limited Holding to Interpret Title VII 
The Court looked to its Gross holding to interpret the meaning 
of “because” in § 2000e-3(a), but by finding that Gross is persuasive, 
the Court ignored that Gross limited its interpretation to only the 
ADEA.130 Even more importantly, the Court also ignored that Gross 
distinguished the ADEA and Title VII. 
In Gross, the Court interpreted “because of”131 to mean a 
requirement of the but-for standard.132 The Court in Gross 
 
 126. Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479–91 (2008). 
 127. Section 2000e-2(a) bans all discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. Although the provision lists characteristics, the ban is a general ban on any discrimination 
based on these factors. 
 128. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2541 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–78 (2009). 
 131. “It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
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acknowledged that, in Price Waterhouse, it interpreted “because of” 
in § 2000e-2(a) as requiring only the motivating-factor standard.133 
To reach its conclusion that “because of” in the ADEA required the 
but-for standard, the Court in Gross distinguished the ADEA from 
Title VII.134 It noted that the interpretation of a Title VII provision 
and its causation standard could not be read into a different statute, 
such as the ADEA.135 The Gross Court specifically cautioned that 
“when conducting statutory interpretation, we must be careful not to 
apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without 
careful and critical examination.”136 Therefore, the Court looked only 
to the text of § 623(a) in the ADEA.137  
Despite this limitation and the distinction between the ADEA 
and Title VII in Gross, the Nassar Court found Gross persuasive in 
interpreting a Title VII provision.138 In 2009, the Court read “because 
of” in § 623(a) of the ADEA to require the but-for causation standard 
by distinguishing it from “because of” in § 2000e-2(a) of Title VII. 
In 2013, the Court found that “because” in § 2000e-3(a) requires a 
plaintiff to meet the but-for causation standard, because there is no 
“meaningful textual difference” between the use of “because” in the 
two statutes and because the two statutes are, in fact, similar.139 
Essentially, according to the Court’s reasoning, “because” in the 
ADEA requires the but-for standard because it is different from Title 
VII, and “because” in § 2000e-3(a) of Title VII requires the but-for 
standard because it is no different from the text of the ADEA. 
2.  The Court Read Different Meanings into 
the Same Word in the Same Statute 
The Court’s textual argument is flawed because the Court’s 
interpretation contradicts a general principle of statutory 
interpretation—that “identical phrases appearing in the same 
 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623 (2006). 
 132. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176. 
 133. Id. at 171. 
 134. Id. at 174–75. 
 135. Id. at 174. 
 136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137. Id. at 175–76. 
 138. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527–28 (2013). 
 139. Id. at 2528. 
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statute . . . ordinarily bear a consistent meaning.”140 The Court read 
the same word, “because,” in different provisions of the same statute 
to have different meanings. “Because of” in § 2000e-2(a) is read to 
require a plaintiff to meet the mixed-motive standard, while 
“because” in § 2000e-3(a) is read to require a plaintiff to meet the 
but-for standard. Thus, the Court has read two different meanings 
into two textually similar words appearing in the same statute in 
contradiction of a general rule of statutory interpretation. 
 
3.  The New Provision’s Placement in the 1991 Act 
The Court reasoned that Congress intended the mixed-motive 
causation standard to only apply to status-based discrimination 
claims because Congress placed the new provision in § 2000e-2. 
However, this reasoning is flawed because the Court’s conclusion is 
based on the idea that § 2000e-2 only contains provisions concerning 
the prohibition against status-based discrimination. 
Section 2000e-2 “does not deal exclusively with discrimination 
based on protected characteristics.”141 Rather, it contains provisions 
that expand beyond application to just status-based discrimination. 
Section 2000e-2 contains fourteen sub-provisions covering other 
issues, such as training programs,142 national security,143 and 
members of the Communist Party.144 In particular, § 2000e-2(g) 
states that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to refuse to hire” or “to discharge any individual from 
any position . . . if” the position “is subject to any requirement 
imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States” 
and “the individual fails to fulfill that requirement.”145 
Section 2000e-2(g) not only identifies status-based discrimination; it 
refers to unlawful employment practices in general.146 
 
 140. Id. at 2545 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 
Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007)). 
 141. Id. at 2543. 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (2006). 
 143. Id. § 2000e-2(g). 
 144. Id. § 2000e-2(f). 
 145. Id. § 2000e-2(g)(1)–(2). 
 146. Id. § 2000e-2(g). 
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Because the Court disregards provisions like § 2000e-2(g) that 
apply to both status-based discrimination and retaliation claims, the 
Court’s reasoning that the placement of § 2000e-2(m) supports its 
holding is flawed. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar will make it much 
more difficult for employees to bring and succeed on Title VII 
retaliation claims. “[T]he ban on discrimination and the ban on 
retaliation against a discrimination complainant have traveled 
together.”147 But now, these two claims must meet very different 
standards. The Nassar holding will have a number of practical 
implications on Title VII lawsuits. 
A.  Difficulty in Seeking Protection Under Title VII 
Plaintiffs bringing a Title VII retaliation claim will have a harder 
time prevailing because they must now meet the but-for standard. 
But, the true implication of the Nassar decision extends beyond the 
difficulties of prevailing in a retaliation claim. Like the plaintiff in 
Nassar, plaintiffs may simply lose the protections of Title VII. 
Nassar brought two Title VII claims: (1) a claim that the 
University discriminated against him on the basis of his race, 
religion, and national origin, which resulted in his constructive 
discharge, and (2) a claim that the University retaliated against him 
after he made a discrimination claim, by preventing his employment 
at the Hospital.148 The jury found for him on both claims.149 The 
Fifth Circuit vacated the jury’s verdict on the constructive discharge 
claim because Nassar did not present sufficient evidence that 
discrimination led to his discharge.150 This left Nassar only a 
retaliation claim. In Nassar, the Supreme Court remanded the case to 
the Fifth Circuit for proceedings consistent with its holding.151 On 
remand, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment in its 
entirety and remanded for proceedings consistent with the Supreme 
 
 147. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2535 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 148. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525 (majority opinion). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 2534. 
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Court’s Nassar holding.152 Because the University can argue that Fitz 
prevented Nassar’s employment at the Hospital because of the 
hospital affiliation agreement, Nassar will likely lose in his case 
against the University. 
Nassar’s experience illustrates a situation where an employee 
has, in fact, experienced discrimination on the basis of race and 
religion, but is left without relief under Title VII as a result of Gross. 
Keiser testified to Levine’s statements regarding Nassar and Middle 
Easterners.153 If an employee takes steps to extricate himself from a 
discriminatory situation, as Nassar did, that employee cannot 
attribute loss of employment to an employer’s discriminatory 
behavior. Nassar notified Fitz and others about Levine’s behavior in 
a letter and terminated his faculty position. If an employer acts 
against the employee for complaining about and removing himself 
from a discriminatory environment, that employee, like Nassar, will 
only have a retaliation claim under Title VII. The Nassar holding 
will leave employees like Nassar with no remedy, for an employer 
acting against an employee is not liable so long as the employer can 
provide any justification (besides the desire to retaliate) for taking a 
retaliatory action. Under § 2000e-3(a), post-Nassar, an employer, 
even if it has discriminated on the basis of status and retaliated 
against an employee, can escape liability by providing evidence of 
any other motivation for a retaliatory action. Requiring plaintiffs to 
prove that retaliation is the but-for (i.e., only) reason for an 
employment action leaves employees unprotected under Title VII. 
B.  Possible Jury Confusion 
The Court states that there is a clear textual and conceptual 
distinction between discrimination and retaliation claims,154 but in 
reality the two claims are not so clearly separated. Like in Nassar, an 
employee’s claims could stem from the same series of actions and 
experiences that ultimately culminate in an employer’s retaliatory 
action. In such a situation, it may be difficult for a jury to clearly 
 
 152. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., No. 11-10338, 2013 WL 3943554, at *1 (5th Cir. 
Aug. 1, 2013). 
 153. See supra note 33, Part III.A. 
 154. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532. 
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differentiate between the two claims and apply separate causation 
standards.155 
In Nassar, both of the plaintiff’s claims ultimately derived from 
his experiences with Levine’s behavior.156 Nassar’s discrimination 
claim was based on Levine’s racial and religious bias, and Nassar’s 
retaliation claim was based on the idea that Fitz blocked his 
employment at the Hospital in part to publicly exonerate Levine from 
Nassar’s complaints of discrimination.157 
The Court may have anticipated concern about jury confusion, 
evidenced by its attempt to differentiate Nassar’s two claims.158 The 
Court presented the status-based discrimination and retaliation 
claims as two separate legal claims, and it also attempted to present 
the two claims as factually distinct.159 According to the Court, the 
wrongdoer of Nassar’s status-based discrimination claim was Levine, 
and this claim required a showing of Levine’s race- and religion-
motivated harassment and bias.160 The wrongdoer in Nassar’s 
retaliation claim was Fitz, and this claim required Nassar to establish 
Fitz’s retaliatory behavior.161 As such, according to the Court, these 
claims were treated separately at trial and on appeal.162 
However, it is unclear whether juries will really treat these 
claims as separate at trial. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the jury 
in Nassar’s case did treat his two claims as distinct. The fact that the 
jury returned separate verdicts for each claim does not alone support 
the Court’s conclusion that the jury considered the two claims 
separately.163 Status-based discrimination claims and retaliation 
claims in situations like Nassar’s—where the discriminatory 
behavior of one University employee is closely intertwined with the 
retaliatory behavior of another University employee—may not be as 
distinct as the Court suggested. 
As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, “trial judges . . . will 
be obliged to charge discrete causation standards when a claim of 
 
 155. See id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 156. See id. at 2523–24 (majority opinion). 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. at 2532. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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[status-based] discrimination . . . is coupled with a claim of 
[retaliation]. And jurors will puzzle over the rhyme or reason for the 
dual standards.”164 
C.  A Challenge to Congress 
The Court in Nassar seemed more concerned with the increasing 
number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC than with actual 
congressional intent, Supreme Court precedent, and reasoning based 
on statutory text and structure.165 However, despite its problematic 
and flawed reasoning, the Court has ruled and its decision is binding 
on lower courts. 
As it stands, the only remedy to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the causation standard of § 2000e-3(a) is 
congressional action. In 1991, Congress responded to the Court’s 
Price Waterhouse decision by passing amendments in the 1991 Act. 
It is once again in Congress’s hands, in the aftermath of a Supreme 
Court interpretation weakening employees’ workplace-
discrimination protections, to strengthen and restore remedies and 
protections under Title VII. 
 
 164. Id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 165. See id. at 2531 (majority opinion); see also supra Part V (arguing that the Court’s 
reasoning in Nassar is flawed ). 
